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I. INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this Article is to explore the role of scandal in bringing
about the reform of forensic science. It uses the forensic discipline of latent print
(fingerprint) analysis as a case study. It further confines itself to two countries:
the United States and the United Kingdom. Each country hosted a major scandal
with regard to fingerprint analysis within the past two decades. These scandals,
commonly known by the names of the victims of misidentification are the
"Mayfield case" in the U.S. and the "McKie case" in the United Kingdom. This
Article seeks to assess the impact of these two scandals on the reforms to
fingerprint analysis that have occurred since the McKie case in 1997. It does so
using the historian's technique of posing a counterfactual: what would
fingerprint analysis look like today had these two scandals not occurred, or, more
realistically, had they occurred, but not been exposed? This Article finds that
these two scandals played important roles in bringing about the reforms in
fingerprint analysis that have occurred in the past two decades. This Article
concludes with some reflections on the implications of this finding: that the
discipline of forensic science and the institutions that are its clients (courts,
police, attorneys, government, the public, etc.) are so heavily dependent on
scandal as an engine for bringing about what few dispute were necessary and
positive reforms. It suggests that we need to seek more stable and less volatile
means of bringing about necessary and positive reforms.
II. Two SCANDALS THAT PLAYED A CRITICAL ROLE IN FINGERPRINT
IDENTIFICATION REFORM
As previously stated, two scandals played a critical role in bringing about
reforms to fingerprint analysis. First, this Article analyzes a 1997 Scottish
fingerprint misidentification case colloquially known as "the McKie case."
Second, this Article analyzes a second fingerprint misidentification case referred
to as "the Mayfield case."
A. The McKie Case
The McKie case is extensively discussed in other sources;' I will merely
provide a brief summary here. Shirley McKie was a Detective Constable in the
I See McKie v. Strathclyde Joint Police Bd. (2003) SLT 982 (Scot.),
http://www.shirleymckie.com/documents/LordWheatley23.12.04.pdf; lAIN MCKE & MICHAEL
RUSSELL, SHIRLEY MCKIE: THE PRICE OF INNOCENCE (2007); ANTHONY CAMPBELL, THE
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Strathclyde Police in 1997 who was part of the team investigating the murder of
Marion Ross at her home in Kilmarnock, Scotland. McKie's duties included
securing the crime scene from outside; she was not supposed to enter the crime
scene, and she reported that she did not.3
David Asbury, a builder,4 was suspected of the murder.5 Scottish
Criminal Records Office ("SCRO") latent print examiners reported that Asbury
was the source of a latent print in Ross's home6 and that Ross was the source of
a latent print on a tin, called Q12, found in Asbury's home. This report was
"verified" by three additional examiners,8 and Asbury was convicted.9
SCRO latent print examiners also reported that McKie was the source of
a latent print, Y7, on a doorjamb in Ross's home.10 Again, the report was verified
by three additional examiners.11 McKie still denied having entered the home.
12
With McKie continuing to deny having entered the home, she was prosecuted
for perjury in 1999.13 Two American latent print examiners, David Grieve and
Pat Wertheim, testified that McKie was excluded as the source of Y7. McKie
was acquitted,14 but her career with the police was over.
Various experts then also questioned the report concerning Q12,
claiming that this too was a misidentification. Asbury's conviction was quashed
in 2002.15 The murder was never solved.
The case then spawned more than a decade of public controversy,
litigation, and various official reports, prompted by McKie and her father lain's
steadfast demand for a full accounting of the erroneous identification. The case
implicated both the vaunted "infallibility" of latent print identification and the
2 McKie, SLT 982 at [1].
3 Id. at [3].
4 CAMPBELL, supra note 2, 4.13.
5 Id. 4.23-.26.
6 McKie, SLT 982 at [3].
7 CAMPBELL, supra note 2, 1.40.
8 Id. 5.65-.80.
9 Id. 71.4.
10 Id. TT 1.3-.31.
I I MACKAY, supra note 2, 15.5.1.7.
12 CAMPBELL, supra note 2, 7.43.
13 Id. TT 1.5-.6.
14 Id. 1.6.
15 Id. T 1.16.
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integrity of the SCRO, as it was debated whether the dispute over the prints was
"a matter of opinion," 16 "an honest mistake," ' 7 or fraud. 18
Of particular note is the fact that the source of Y7 remains disputed.
While the majority of world latent print examiner opinion holds that McKie is
excluded as the source of Y7, there are British latent print examiners to this day
who insist that she is the source. In addition, as the story unraveled, differences
of opinion were revealed on both sides. Specifically, it was revealed that there
were examiners in the SCRO who doubted the identification,19 and that some of
McKie's retained examiners had corroborated the disputed identification.
The 2011 800-page Fingerprint Inquiry Report ("Inquiry Report") is
probably the last official word on the case.2° It concluded that the identifications
of both Y7 and Q12 were erroneous, but it exonerated the SCRO of any
intentional misconduct.21 The conclusion of the Inquiry Report resulted in an
official apology to McKie.22 The Inquiry Report also had much to say with regard
to reforming latent print analysis,23 about which we will learn more below.
B. The Mayfield Case
As with the McKie case, the Mayfield case has been extensively
discussed elsewhere,24 and I will provide only a brief summary. A latent print,
16 Simon A. Cole, The 'Opinionization" of Fingerprint Evidence, 3 BIoSOCIETIES 105, 107
(2008).
17 CAMPBELL, supra note 2, 1.19.
18 Cole, supra note 16, at 106.
19 McKie v. Strathclyde Joint Police Bd. (2003) SLT 982 [4] (Scot.),
http://www.shirleymckie.com/documents/LordWheatley23.12.04.pdf
20 CAMPBELL, supra note 1.
21 Id. at 739.




23 See CAMPBELL, supra note 2, at 740-52.
24 See OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN. OVERSIGHT & REVIEW Div., A REVIEW OF THE FBI's
HANDLING OF THE BRANDON MAYFIELD CASE (2006) [hereinafter REVIEW OF THE FBI'S HANDLING
OF THE BRANDON MAYFIELD CASE], https://oig.justice.gov/special/s0601/final.pdf, OFFICE OF THE
INSPECTOR GEN. OVERSIGHT & REVIEW Div., A REVIEW OF THE FBI's PROGRESS IN RESPONDING TO
THE RECOMMENDATIONS IN THE OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL REPORT ON THE FINGERPRINT
MISIDENTIFICATION IN THE BRANDON MAYFIELD CASE (2011) [hereinafter REVIEW OF THE FBI's
PROGRESS IN RESPONDING TO THE RECOMMENDATIONS IN THE OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL],
https://oig.justice.gov/special/s1 05.pdf; William C. Thompson & Simon A. Cole, Lessons from
the Brandon Mayfield Case, CHAMPION 42 (Apr. 2005),
http://www.clpex.com/Articles/TheDetaiU200-299/TheDetail201.htm; Steven T. Wax &
Christopher J. Schatz, A Multitude of Errors: The Brandon Mayfield Case, CHAMPION 6 (Sept./Oct.
[Vol. 119
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LFP 17, was found on a plastic bag containing detonators during the investigation
of the 2004 terrorist bombing in Madrid, Spain,25 that was eventually attributed
to Al Qaeda. After failing to find a source for the print, the Spanish National
Police ("SNP") began circulating the latent print worldwide. The U.S. Federal
Bureau of Investigation ("FBI") received the print and searched it against its
Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System ("IAFIS") database.
26
FBI latent print examiners reported that Brandon Mayfield, an Oregon attorney,
was the source of LFP17.27 This report was "verified" by two additional
examiners.28
Although there was no record of Mayfield having traveled to Spain, and
he did not have a valid passport,29 circumstantial evidence seemed to support the
FBI's suspicions.30 Mayfield was a Muslim convert, his wife was born in Egypt,
and he "had represented a convicted terrorist in a child custody dispute," among
other seemingly incriminating facts.3 1 Based on FBI affidavits,32 Mayfield was
made the subject of a Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act ("FISA") warrant,
for surreptitious searches and electronic surveillance.3 3 Notably, the affidavit
stated that the FBI had made a "100 percent positive" identification of Mayfield
as the source of LFP17.34
In the meantime, the SNP was disputing the FBI conclusion that
Mayfield was the source of LFP17, remaining unconvinced of the
identification.35
One important part of the story that is omitted from many accounts is
that there were media leaks in Europe about an American suspect in the Madrid
bombing.3" It was these leaks which forced the FBI to apprehend Mayfield as a
material witness, rather than keeping him under covert surveillance.37
2004); Robert B. Stacey, A Report on the Erroneous Fingerprint Individualization in the Madrid
Train Bombing Case, 54 J. FORENSIC IDENTIFICATION 706 (2004).
25 REVIEW OF THE FBI's HANDLING OF THE BRANDON MAYFIELD CASE, supra note 24, at 1.
26 Id.
27 Id.
28 Id. at 2.
29 Id. at 58.
30 Id. at 2.
31 Id.
32 Id. at 240.
33 Id. at 2.
34 Id. at 63-64.
35 Id. at 41.
36 Id. at 19.
37 Id.
5
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Mayfield was appointed attorneys,38 and the court retained an
independent latent print examiner on Mayfield's behalf.39 This examiner
reported that he agreed with the FBI examiners that Mayfield was the source of
LFP17.40
Shortly thereafter, a SNP database search of LFP 17 yielded a candidate
named Ouhnane Daoud.41 SNP examiners reported that he was the source of
LFP17.42 FBI examiners soon concurred.43 Mayfield was released with a public
apology,44 the first publicly known erroneous identification ever reported by the
FBI. Daoud, an Algerian living in Spain, was killed in a police raid.45
The Mayfield case too, generated public controversy and several reports,
the most definitive of which is the Department of Justice Office of the Inspector
General ("OIG") report.46 The examiners involved were disciplined by the
International Association for Identification ("IAI"). 4 7 Unlike the McKie case, the
identification does not remain disputed; there are virtually no professional latent
print examiners who claim that Mayfield was the source of LFP 17.
III. THEN AND Now: THE STATE OF FINGERPRINT ANALYSIS
In this part, I compare the state of fingerprint analysis in 1997, when the
McKie case occurred, to its state today. I do not examine the state of the
discipline in 2004, when the Mayfield case occurred, since that came later.
A. The State of Fingerprint Analysis in 1997
When the Ross murder occurred in 1997, it was routine for fingerprint
practitioners and others to describe the technique as "infallible., 48 Fingerprint
identifications were characterized as "facts," and legal challenges to them were
considered almost unthinkable. Differences of opinion amongst fingerprint
examiners were thought to be extraordinarily rare and only possible through
38 Id. at 71.
39 Id. at 80.
40 Id. at 3.
41 Id.
42 Id. at 81.
43 Id. at 3.
44 Id. at 21.
45 Id. at 81.
46 See generally id. at 1-330; REVIEW OF THE FBI's PROGRESS IN RESPONDING TO THE
RECOMMENDATIONS IN THE OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, supra note 24.
47 See Int'l Ass'n for Identification, Latent Print Certification Actions, 55 J. FORENSIC
IDENTIFICATION 658 (2005).
48 FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, THE SCIENCE OF FINGERPRINTS: CLASSIFICATION AND USES
iv (1984); CAMPBELL, supra note 1, 10.19.
[Vol. 119
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malfeasance or incompetence; differences between honest, competent examiners
were believed impossible. Fingerprint conclusions were thought to be
unproblematically derived from the impression data itself; the human examiner
who functioned as the scientific instrument for fingerprint analyses was believed
to be immune to influence from any other sources. Documentation consisted
solely of a conclusion, rather than an account of the ridge features observed and
how they supported the conclusion. Testimony concerning fingerprint
identifications was framed in rather haphazard ways, but the upshot was always
that the defendant was the only possible source of the latent print; zero
probability was assigned to all other hypotheses. Indeed, fingerprint evidence
was sometimes characterized as "non-probabilistic" evidence.4 9 Most fingerprint
examiners would have been surprised to be asked to name their "methodology";
almost none of them, outside of Canada, would have answered "ACE-V"
(Analyze, Compare, Evaluate-Verify);5 ° they might have said "the conventional
method.,51 The empirical foundation behind such claims was thought to be the
indisputable uniqueness of human friction ridge skin and (at least in the U.K.)
the ostensibly over-conservative 16-point standard.52 Astonishingly, nearly a
century into the routine use of fingerprint evidence, these claims were not based
on scientific studies measuring the accuracy of fingerprint examiners'
conclusions. No such study existed. Nor was there an empirically tested model
that would allow one to estimate the rarity of a set of friction ridge features in a
population of friction ridge skin-the sort of knowledge that had by then been
developed for forensic DNA profiling. Still, fingerprinting was often called the
"gold standard" in forensic science, and forensic DNA analysts often couched
their conclusions as "not as certain as a fingerprint identification," though still
strong.53
B. The State of Fingerprint Analysis Today
By 2011, when the long-awaited Fingerprint Inquiry Report about the
McKie Affair was published, fingerprint identification had changed. Claims of
"infallibility" were rarer, though not extinct, and the Inquiry Report has stated
49 David L. Grieve, Possession of Truth, 46 J. FORENSIC IDENTIFICATION 521, 521 (1996); J.R.
Vanderkolk, Class Characteristics and 'Could Be' Results, 43 J. FORENSIC IDENTIFICATION 119,
119 (1993).
50 REVIEW OF THE FBI's HANDLING OF THE BRANDON MAYFIELD CASE, supra note 24, at 197.
51 Robert D. Olsen, Sr., & Henry C. Lee, Identification of Latent Prints, in ADVANCES IN
FINGERPRINT TECHNOLOGY 41 (Henry C. Lee & R. E. Gaensslen eds., 2001).
52 C. Neumann et al., Quantifying the Weight of Evidence from a Forensic Fingerprint
Comparison: A New Paradigm, 175 J. ROYAL STAT. SoC'Y A 371, 374 (2012).
53 Katherine Schwinghammer, Fingerprint Identification: How "The Gold Standard of
Evidence" Could Be Worth Its Weight, 32 AM. J. CRiM. L. 265 (2005).
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that they should be put to rest.54 Two major, new U.S. reports, one by a
committee convened by the National Academies of Science ("NAS") and one by
a committee convened jointly by the National Institute of Standards and
Technology ("NIST") and the National Institute of Justice ("NIJ"), now say that
claims of infallibility should not be made.55 So does the International Association
for Identification ("IAI"). 56A number of authorities, including the Inquiry
Report, have suggested that fingerprint conclusions are better characterized as
"opinion[s]" than as "fact[s].,, 57 A standard-setting American expert body, the
Scientific Working Group for Friction Ridge Analysis Study and Technology
("SWGFAST"), goes further still and suggests that fingerprint identifications be
conceptualized as "decision[s].,5 8 A number of authorities, including the Inquiry
Report itself, are now conceding the fallaciousness of reasoning from the
uniqueness of human friction ridge skin to the accuracy of fingerprint
identification.9
Contextual bias, the notion that fingerprint examiners can be influenced
by factors other than the data in the impression itself, is now widely conceded,
even within the profession-and, of course, by the Inquiry Report-to be a real
phenomenon.6' Few publicly take the position that fingerprint evidence is "non-
probabilistic" evidence anymore. Indeed, a new IAI resolution explicitly
54 CAMPBELL, supra note 1, 38.77.
55 COMM'N ON IDENTIFYING THE NEEDS OF THE FORENSIC SCIS. CMTY., NAT'L RES. COUNCIL,
STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES: A PATH FORWARD 142 (2009)
[hereinafter NAS REPORT], https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/nij/grants/228091.pdf; THE EXPERT
WORKING GRP. ON HUMAN FACTORS IN LATENT PRINT ANALYSIS, NIST & NIJ, LATENT PRINT
EXAMINATION AND HUMAN FACTORS: IMPROVING THE PRACTICE THROUGH A SYSTEMS APPROACH
127 (2012) [hereinafter NIST REPORT],
https://www.nist.gov/sites/default/files/documents/oles/latent.pdf
56 Memorandum from Robert Garrett, President, Int'l Assoc. for Identification, to All Members
of the Int'l Assoc. for Identification (Feb. 19, 2009),
http://www.clpex.com/Articles/TheDetail/300-399/TheDetail394.htm.
57 CAMPBELL, supra note 1, 35.132.
58 SCI. WORKING GRP. ON FRICTION RIDGE ANALYSIS STUDY AND TECH., STANDARDS FOR
EXAMINING FRICTION RIDGE IMPRESSIONS AND RESULTING CONCLUSIONS, ver. 1.0, §4.3.2.2 (2011),
http://www.swgfast.org/documents/examinations-conclusions/I I1l026_Examinations-
Conclusionsl.0.pdf.
59 CAMPBELL, supra note 1, 2.30-.34.; Glenn Langenburg, Scientific Research Supporting
the Foundations of Friction Ridge Examinations, in FINGERPRINT SOURCEBOOK 14-3, 14-7
(SWGFAST et al. eds., 2012); Jennifer L. Mnookin et al., The Need for a Research Culture in the
Forensic Sciences, 58 UCLA L. REv. 725, 751 (2011).
60 See CAMPBELL, supra note 1, 35.137; Frequently Asked Questions, SCIENTIFIC WORKING
GRP. ON FRICTION RIDGE ANALYSIS STUDY AND TECH., http://www.swgfast.org/FAQs.html (last
visited Nov. 10, 2016).
[Vol. 119
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disavows this position.61 The "methodology" of latent print examination is now
said to be ACE-V (Analyze, Compare, Evaluate-Verify),62 a heuristic taken
from the Canadian forensic scientist Tuthill.63 Hardly anyone advocates "point
standards" anymore; the 16-point standard was abandoned in England and Wales
in 200164 and Scotland in 2006.65 The "ridgeology revolution" promoted by the
Canadian fingerprint analyst Ashbaugh can largely be said to have won the day
within the profession.66 Differences of opinion between examiners, though still
problematic, are becoming increasingly "normalized;" the Inquiry Report
devotes substantial attention to ways of documenting and reporting such
differences and stresses that they should be treated as expected outcomes of
normal processes, rather than deviations or pathologies.67
It is no longer true that there are no accuracy studies for fingerprint
identification; the first such studies have recently been published.68 More
sophisticated models aimed at estimating the rarity of friction ridge features in a
population are also being published.69 Fingerprinting is not legally indisputable
anymore either. Although the vast majority of courts worldwide continue to
admit fingerprint evidence, one U.S. court, in the case State v. Rose,70 excluded
the evidence for failing to meet the Frye standard for scientific evidence.71
Although the case was refiled in a federal court, which quickly admitted the
61 INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR IDENTIFICATION, STANDARDIZATION II REVIEW
COMMITTEE, RESOLUTION 2010-18 (2010),
http://www.swgfast.org/Resources/100716_IAI Resolution2010-18.pdf.
62 See REVIEW OF THE FBI's HANDLING OF THE BRANDON MAYFIELD CASE, supra note 24, at
105.
63 See HAROLD TUTHILL, INDIVIDUALIZATION: PRINCIPLES AND PROCEDURES IN CRIMINALISTICS
29-30 (1994).
64 Langenburg, supra note 59, at 14-6, 14-7.
65 Court Fingerprint System Scrapped, BBC NEWS (Sept. 4, 2006),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/scotland/5310246.stm.
66 DAVID R. ASHBAUGH, QUANTITATIVE-QUALITATIVE FRICTION RIDGE ANALYSIS: AN
INTRODUCTION TO BASIC AND ADVANCED RIDGEOLOGY 7-9 (1999).
67 CAMPBELL, supra note 1, 36.118.
68 Glenn Langenburg et al., Informing the Judgments of Fingerprint Analysts Using Quality
Metric and Statistical Assessment Tools, 219 FORENSIC SCI. INT'L 183 (2012); Glenn Langenburg,
A Performance Study of the A CE- V Process: A Pilot Study to Measure the Accuracy, Precision,
Reproducibility, Repeatability, and Biasability of Conclusions Resulting From the ACE- VProcess,
59 J. FORENSIC IDENTIFICATION 219 (2009); Jason M. Tangen et al., Identifying Fingerprint
Expertise, 22 PSYCHOL. SCI. 995 (2011); Bradford T. Ulery et al., Repeatability and Reproducibility
of Decisions by Latent Fingerprint Examiners, 7 PLoS ONE e32800 (2012); Bradford T. Ulery et
al., Accuracy and Reliability of Forensic Latent Fingerprint Decisions, 108 PROC. NAT'L ACAD.
SCIS. 7733 (2011) [hereinafter Ulery et al., Accuracy and Reliability].
69 Neumann et al., supra note 52.
70 No. K06-0545, 2007 Md. Cir. Ct. LEXIS 14, at *44 (Md. Cir. Ct. Oct. 19, 2007).
71 Id.
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evidence, the opinion was discussed favorably in the NAS Report. Meanwhile,
an English court expressed surprise and dismay that a fingerprint report
contained only a conclusion rather than contemporaneous documentation of the
reasons for the conclusion and quashed the conviction.73 A Canadian court
excluded latent print evidence that it found wanting.74 Thus, efforts to provide
contemporaneous documentation and the rationale for the expressed opinion are
spreading. Fingerprinting is rarely called the gold standard anymore; DNA
profiling is the epistemically dominant technology in forensic science today, and,
indeed, many of the above changes can be characterized as part of the process of
remaking fingerprinting in the image of DNA.75
More changes appear to be on the way. The Inquiry Report calls for the
broad reform of fingerprint analysis in Scotland, but its implications certainly
would seem to extend further.76 The two reports by the NAS and NIST/NIJ also
urge broad changes.77 Research by forensic statisticians suggests that witnesses
could testify about fingerprint evidence in a probabilistic fashion in the
foreseeable future.7 8 The stringent masking procedures adopted in countries such
as the Netherlands79 and, more recently, at the FBI to reduce bias and circular
reasoning could become widespread.80 To be sure, such developments hould not
be taken for granted. They will require continued effort and pressure. But they
are at least conceivable, whereas in 1997 such changes might have seemed
inconceivable.
These are remarkable changes to have taken place during the 15 year
course of the scandals. But did they take place because of the McKie and
Mayfield scandals? Certainly, the McKie and Mayfield scandals bear some
responsibility (or deserve some credit) for these changes, but how much? This
Article will seek to address this question.
72 United States v. Rose, 672 F. Supp. 2d 723, 726 (D. Md. 2009); NAS REPORT, supra note
55, at 43.
73 R. v. Peter Kenneth Smith [2011] EWCA (Crim) 1296 at [61] (Eng.).
74 R. v. Bornyk, 2013 BCSC 1927, para. 59-61 (Can. B.C. S.C.).
75 Soren Frederiksen, The National Academy of Sciences, Canadian DNA Jurisprudence and
Changing Forensic Practice, 35 MAN. L.J. 111, 112-13 (2011).
76 See CAMPBELL, supra note 2, at 741-52.
77 NAS REPORT, supra note 55; NIST REPORT, supra note 55.
78 Neumann et al., supra note 52, at 393-94.
79 Reinoud D. Stoel et al., Minimizing Contextual Bias in Forensic Casework, in FORENSIC
SCIENCE AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE: CRITICAL ISSUES AND DIRECTIONS 67, 79 (Kevin J.
Strom & Matthew J. Hickman eds., 2015) (ebook).
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IV. HISTORICAL CONTEXT: OTHER FORCES LEADING TO CHANGE IN
FINGERPRINT IDENTIFICATION PRIOR TO MCKIE AND MAYFIELD
Above I reviewed some of the changes in fingerprint practice that have
occurred since the McKie Affair began. While no one would doubt that the
McKie and Mayfield scandals played some role in bringing about those changes,
at the same time no one would claim that the McKie and Mayfield scandals were
the sole cause of these changes. To fully understand the role of the scandals, we
must begin by reviewing the other forces for change in fingerprinting that were
gathering before the McKie and Mayfield scandals broke.
A. Debate Regarding Point Counting Versus Ridgeology
It would be a mistake to think that the McKie and Mayfield scandals
occurred at a time in which fingerprint practice was static. There were some
things that had not changed since the origins of fingerprinting, to be sure, but
fingerprinting was already in a state of dynamic change by 1997. To begin with,
what has been called the "ridgeology revolution" was already underway.81 It has
been suggested that the notion of a holistic estimate of the rarity of the ridge
detail in a latent print, for which a counting of "points" was a mere shorthand,
82
can be traced back to the thought of Edmond Locard or even, in a less well
articulated way, the Scotsman Faulds.83 But the nuances of Locard's thinking
were mostly lost on the fingerprint profession, and "point standards" had
emerged in many bureaus as de facto thresholds that warranted conclusions of
"individualization."84 Even the North American-dominated IAI's 1973
disavowal of point standards stood more for the freedom of the examiner to set
her own point standard on a case-by-case basis than for a full embracing of the
notion of a holistic assessment of the rarity of ridge detail.85 The writings of
Ashbaugh elevated the idea of holistic assessment to a principle.86 Ashbaugh also
81 Simon A. Cole, What Counts for Identity? The Historical Origins of the Methodology of
Latent Fingerprint Identification, 12 ScI. CONTEXT 139, 139-41 (1999).
82 Id.
83 Christophe Champod, Edmond Locard-Numerical Standards and "Probable"
Identifications, 45 J. FORENSIC IDENTIFICATION 136, 136 (1995); Cole, supra note 81, at 147.
84 See Christophe Champod & Paul Chamberlain, Fingerprints, in HANDBOOK OF FORENSIC
SCIENCE 57, 72 (Jim Fraser & Robin Williams eds., 2009).
85 John Thornton, Setting Standards in the Comparison and Identification, Presentation at the
84th Annual Training Conference of the California State Division of IAI (May 9, 2000);
International Association for Identification, Standardization Committee Report, 42 FBI Law
Enforcement Bulletin 7 (Oct. 1973).
86 See David R. Ashbaugh, The Premise of Friction Ridge Identification, Clarity, and the
Identification Process, 44 J. FORENSIC IDENTIFICATION 499 (1994); David R. Ashbaugh, Defined
Pattern, Overall Pattern, and Unique Pattern, 42 J. FORENSIC IDENTIFICATION 503 (1992); David
R. Ashbaugh, Ridgeology, 41 J. FORENSIC IDENTIFICATION 16 (1991) [hereinafter Ridgeology].
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argued that this holistic assessment must be situated within knowledge of the
anatomy of skin,87 and he included some highly critical remarks about a "cultish
demeanor" and unscientific thinking associated with the point counting
approach. 88 The result was that Ashbaugh's efforts were cast as a "revolution"
and generated a quite heated debate over "point counting versus ridgeology" that
was reaching its apogee during the 1990s. Not surprisingly, ridgeology found its
staunchest advocates in North America.89 Perhaps because they (mostly) spoke
the same language, the British emerged as their principal antagonists in
advocating for point standards.9°
B. Attacks on Point Standards
The U.K. 16-point standard was under attack from another quarter as
well: a report by Evett and Williams commissioned by the Home Office,
completed in 1989, but not published until 1996.91 It concluded that the 16-point
standard was rooted in anecdote-faulty anecdote at that-rather than science.
They added a small empirical study that demonstrated a lack of reliability
(consistency) between examiners in terms of how many "points" were identified
in the same impression and suggested that examiners might "tease out" points
and conform their analyses to the local standard.
Thus, by the mid-1990s, the 16-point standard was under attack from at
least two flanks. These two critiques, however, were quite different. While
Ashbaugh's thinking was not rooted in probabilistic or statistical reasoning at all,
Evett is among the pioneering theorists in the field we might broadly call
"forensic statistics," and, in particular, for what has been called "the Bayesian
approach" to forensic evidence. Evett's critique of the 16-point standard, then,
might be viewed as only one aspect of a much broader argument being mounted
by the entire field of forensic statistics: that all forensic evidence is essentially
probabilistic in nature. Moreover, forensic statisticians, as well as other
scientifically minded forensic scientists, had consolidated a broad consensus
around an approach-often called "the Bayesian approach," but some prefer
simply "the logical approach"-to assessing the value of forensic evidence that
Lindley had pioneered for the analysis of glass.92 Forensic statisticians believed
this approach could, in principle, be applied to all forensic evidence, had
articulated its application to glass and other areas, and had seen it applied
87 See Ridgeology, supra note 86, at 26, 40.
88 ASHBAUGH, supra note 66, at 4.
89 See Champod & Chamberlain, supra note 84, at 73.
90 G.T.C. Lambourne, Fingerprint Standards, 24 MED. Sci. & L. 227 (1984).
91 I.W. Evett & R.L. Williams, A Review of the Sixteen Points Fingerprint Standard in
England and Wales, 46 J. FORENSIC IDENTIFICATION 49 (1996); CAMPBELL, supra note 1, 32.10.
92 Colin Aitken et al., Expressing Evaluative Opinions: A Position Statement, 51 Sci. & JUST.
1 (2011); D. V. Lindley, Probability and the Law, 26 STATISTICIAN 203 (1977).
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successfully in practice to DNA profiling. They saw no reason why it should not
be applied to fingerprint evidence as well.93 Forensic statisticians found
unpersuasive the counter-argument that the "data structure,94 of fingerprint
pattern information did not lend itself well to this approach; the fundamental
logic of their approach did not yield before the relative ease or difficulty of
generating the necessary data.
Evett would not explicitly articulate the necessity of adopting the
Bayesian approach for fingerprinting in the kind of public manner that would
capture the attention of fingerprint practitioners and attorneys until his seminal
paper with Champod in 2001.95 However, we can safely conclude that the seeds
of Evett and Champod's thinking were already in place by the mid-i 990s and
that they would have gotten there with or without the McKie and Mayfield
scandals. Interestingly, Champod and Evett's article does not mention the McKie
Affair at all; instead, it is primarily motivated by the United States v. Mitchell
96
case, the first American legal admissibility challenge to latent print evidence
after Daubert.
97
C. Other Literature and Arguments Questioning the Reliability of
Fingerprint Identification
In retrospect, we can see that some articulations in need of a probabilistic
approach to fingerprint evidence were already in the literature by 1997: in Locard
and Faulds, as mentioned above, and more clearly in work in the 1960s and 70s
by Kirk, Kingston, Osterburg, and Kwan.98 A 1990 law article by Robertson,
another major figure in the forensic statistics movement, also laid out the logic
of a probabilistic approach.99 But, in contrast to Evett and Champod's manifesto
93 Christophe Champod, Fingerprints (Dactyloscopy): Standard of Proof ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
FORENSIC SCIS. 884 (2000); Franco Taroni & Pierre Margot, Letter to the Editor-Fingerprint
Evidence Evaluation: Is it Really So Different to Other Evidence Types?, 40 ScI. & JUST. 277
(2000).
94 I very much like Morrison's use of this term to describe a difference between fingerprints
and DNA profiles. Geoffrey Stewart Morrison, Measuring the Validity and Reliability of Forensic
Likelihood-Ratio Systems, 51 SCI. & JUST. 3 (2011).
95 Christophe Champod & Ian W. Evett, A Probabilistic Approach to Fingerprint Evidence,
51 J. FORENSIC IDENTIFICATION 101 (2001).
96 365 F.3d 215 (3d Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 974 (2004).
97 Id.; Paul C. Giannelli, Daubert Challenges to Fingerprints, FACULTY PUBLICATIONS (2006),
http://scholarlycommons.law.case.educgi/viewcontent.cgi?article= 1154&context-faculty-public
ations.
98 Charles R. Kingston & Paul L. Kirk, Historical Development and Evaluation of the "12
Point Rule" in Fingerprint Identification, 186 INT'L CRIM. POLICE REV. 62 (1965); Quon Yin
Kwan, Inference of Identity of Source (1977) (thesis, University of California, Berkeley); James
W. Osterburg, An Inquiry Into the Nature of Proof 9 J. FORENSIC SCI. 413 (1964).
99 Bernard W.N. Robertson, Fingerprints, Relevance and Admissibility, 2 N.Z. RECENT L. REv.
252 (1990).
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published in the leading practitioner journal, the Journal of Forensic
Identification, these papers received little notice from practitioners or even
attorneys.
In addition to forensic statisticians, others had begun to glimpse the
problems with fingerprint identification prior to 1997. A philosopher and a
printer both published relatively obscure articles noting the fallacy of reasoning
from uniqueness to accuracy in 1995 and 1997 respectively.100 But such
publications stood little chance of having an impact on practitioners or attorneys.
Legal scholars were in a better position to influence attorneys. Saks noted the
absence of accuracy data on fingerprinting as early as 1994, and this criticism
was picked up by Berger.10 1 Starrs was also publishing statements that
demonstrated a grasp of the problems with fingerprint identification, but most of
them appeared in his not widely available newsletter Scientific Sleuthing
Review.10 2 Again, these statements seemed to have little impact on attorneys.
What finally seemed to have an impact on attorneys were two things: the Daubert
v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals"3 decision in 1993 that opened the door to
admissibility challenges to fingerprinting and the publication of critiques of
fingerprint evidence by Stoney on scientific grounds and Faigman et al. on legal
grounds in a more visible treatise, Modern Scientific Evidence, in 1997.104
Stoney clearly had grasped, and published, the problems with fingerprint
identification well prior to 1997.105 But, Stoney's work was aimed at a general
forensic science audience, rather than fingerprint practitioners or attorneys. It
was not explicitly framed as a critique of fingerprint identification, and-though
it may not have been intended that way-it may have appeared to resolve
whatever statistical issues had been raised through a "leap of faith," in which the
100 Hugh McLachlan, No Two Sets the Same? Applying Philosophy to the Theory of
Fingerprints, 83 PHILOSOPHER 12 (1995); Fred Woodworth, A Printer Looks at Fingerprints, THE
MATCH! (Winter 1997).
101 Margaret A. Berger, Procedural Paradigms for Applying the Daubert Test, 78 MINN. L. REV.
1345 (1994); Michael J. Saks, Implications of the Daubert Test for Forensic Identification Science,
1 SHEPARD'S EXPERT & ScI. EVIDENCE Q. 427 (1994).
102 James E. Starrs, A Miscue in Fingerprint Identification: Causes and Concern, 12 J. POLICE
ScI. & ADMIN. 287 (1984); James E. Starrs, More Saltimbancos on the Loose? Fingerprint Experts
Caught in a Whorl of Error, 12 ScI. SLEUTHNGNEWSL. 1 (1988); James E. Starrs, Forensic Science
on the Ropes: Procellous Times in the Citadels of Infallibility, 20 Sci. SLEUTHING REV. 1 (1996).
103 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
104 Id.; MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND SCIENCE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY (David
L. Faigman et al. eds., 1st ed. 1997); see also Michael J. Saks, Merlin and Solomon: Lessons from
the Law's Formative Encounters with Forensic Identification Science, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 1069,
1071-72, 1105-06 (1998).
105 See David A. Stoney, What Made Us Ever Think We Could Individualize Using Statistics?,
31 J. FORENSIC SCI. SOC'Y 197 (1991); David A. Stoney & John I. Thornton, A Critical Analysis of
Quantitative Fingerprint Individuality Models, 31 J. FORENSIC SCI. 1187 (1986); David A. Stoney,
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analyst decides that two prints come from a common source even through she
cannot actually know that. Stoney's 1997 article, in contrast, was in an evidence
treatise and could be read by an attorney as a road map for an admissibility
challenge to fingerprint evidence. Armed with Daubert's insistence that the
accuracy of evidence must be demonstrated and legal academics' critiques,
American defense attorneys were able to mount cogent and rationally compelling
(if tactically unsuccessful) challenges to fingerprint evidence by 1999.106
The statistical critique of fingerprinting gained powerful rhetorical
traction from the success of forensic DNA profiling, 0 7 which showed that
forensic evidence could be useful even if it was not "absolute" or certain.10 8 It
also showed that there were complex issues concerning how to account for
probabilities for DNA association about which even experts disagreed.0 9 Under
these circumstances, the utter evasion of probabilities in fingerprint identification
began to seem less tenable.10
Another line of critique emerged from psychologists, who had expressed
concerns about the impact of "observer effects"11' on forensic analyses. These
psychologists argued that some forensic errors might be caused by instilling
"expectations"" 2 in analysts that forensic traces should be associated with one
another."13 They pointed out that many fields of science took measures to reduce
the possibility of "confirmation bias"' 1 4 and that these measures were absent in
forensic science. 15 Though there was a small amount of data on bias in forensic
science,'16 in the 2000s Dror and colleagues carried out a series of experiments
106 Robert Epstein, Fingerprints Meet Daubert: The Myth of Fingerprint "Science " is Revealed,
75 S. CAL. L. REv. 605, 605-06, 606 n.7 (2002).
107 Jennifer L. Mnookin, Fingerprints: Not a Gold Standard, IssUES SCI. AND TECH., Fall 2003,
issues.org/20-1/mnookin.
108 Simon A. Cole, Forensic Identification Evidence: Utility Without Infallibility, 9
CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL'Y 375, 377 (2010) [hereinafter Cole, Forensic Identification Evidence].
109 Id. at 376-77.
110 See Simon A. Cole, Forensics Without Uniqueness, Conclusions Without Individualization:
The New Epistemology of Forensic Identification, 8 L. PROBABILITY & RISK 233 (2009); Cole,
Forensic Identification Evidence, supra note 108.
III D. Michael Risinger et al., The Daubert/Kumho Implications of Observer Effects in Forensic
Science: Hidden Problems of Expectation and Suggestion, 90 CALIF. L. REv. 1, 27 (2002).
112 Id.
113 Id. at 29-30.
114 Id. at 9.
"1 Id. at 31.
116 See, e.g., Larry S. Miller, Procedural Bias in Forensic Science Examinations of Human
Hair, 11 L..& HUM. BEHAV. 157 (1987).
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that demonstrated the existence of bias in fingerprint analysis.'17 These studies
attracted a great deal attention and shook the fingerprint community.'
18
Thus, by 1997, the status quo in fingerprint identification was being
challenged from many quarters. From within the profession, the ridgeology
revolution demanded changes in education and training and in conceptualizing
fingerprint associations and removing the "safety net" of a point standard. From
outside the fingerprint specialty, but still within forensic science, statisticians
were insisting that it was time to transform fingerprint evidence from
"categorical" to probabilistic evidence. Legal academics, soon joined by
academics from other disciplines like psychology, were pointing out the absence
of accuracy measurements and rarity data and the pernicious effect of
confirmation bias. This seemed to place fingerprint identification in serious
jeopardy of exclusion under Daubert.
D. The Likelihood of Change in Fingerprint Identification Without the
McKie and Mayfield Scandals
Would all of these forces, already in play by 1997, have wrought the
changes that we have seen in fingerprint identification without the McKie and
Mayfield scandals? It seems unlikely. Policy scholars note that reform from
within, known as endogenous change, is rare because "most policies are firmly
rooted in inert institutional settings and a state of policy equilibrium, which
cannot be changed from within. Therefore," they argue, "stimuli, external to the
policy subsystem," sometimes called "external crises" are "required for non-
incremental policy change."119 The fingerprint community, like most
occupational communities, was conservative, especially when change was
proposed by outsiders like forensic statisticians and academics.20 The
documentary history of the late 1990s and early 2000s amply attests to the
hostility and defensiveness with which the profession reacted to external
criticism.121 The courts, meanwhile, by dismissing all criticisms and issuing
opinions not only reaffirming the admissibility of latent print evidence but also
allowing examiners to testify in terms of absolute certainty, created disincentives
117 Itiel E. Dror & David Charlton, Why Experts Make Errors, 56 J. FORENSIC IDENTIFICATION
600 (2006); Itiel E. Dror et al., Contextual Information Renders Experts Vulnerable to Making
Erroneous Identifications, 156 FORENSIC SCI. INT'L 74 (2006); Itiel E. Dror et al., When Emotions
Get the Better of Us: The Effect of Contextual Top-Down Processing on Matching Fingerprints,
19 APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 799 (2005).
118 See, e.g., Martin Leadbetter, Letter to the Editor, 33 FINGERPRINT WHORLD 230 (2007),
http://www.clpex.com/Articles/TheDetail/300-399/TheDetail335 .htm.
119 Daniel Nohrstedt & Christopher M. Weible, The Logic of Policy Change After Crisis:
Proximity and Subsystem Interaction, 1 RISK HAZARDS & CRISIS IN PUB. POL'Y 1, 3 (2010).
120 See, e.g., Andre A. Moenssens, The Reliability of Fingerprint Identification: A Case Report
(Jan. 17, 2002), http://onin.com/fp/reliability-of fp-ident.html.
121 See, e.g., id.
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to reconceptualizing fingerprint identification or even doing research studies. If
nothing else, the last 15 years have demonstrated that reformers alone neither
individually nor collectively possessed sufficient authority to persuade the
relevant actors (fingerprint professionals, courts, government bureaucracies,
legislatures) that change was needed.
V. RATIONALES FOR FINGERPRINT REFORM
Above I have described what we might call principled criticisms of
fingerprint identification. I label them "principled" because they are not
dependent, in a direct way, on claims of error. Such criticisms did not generally
point to actual exposed cases of error. Even when they did, error was not the
main driver of their arguments. Instead, they argued for changes to fingerprint
identification because doing things properly was viewed as a good in itself. For
example, it may be difficult to show directly that the adoption of
contemporaneous documentation practices will reduce errors. Indeed, remedying
this area might not have any effect at all on fingerprinting's contribution to
truthful judicial outcomes. But, some would argue it should be remedied
nonetheless.
However, it appears that a second major force was necessary to drive
change in fingerprint identification. As noted above, policy scholars argue that
external crises are typically necessary to drive major policy reforms.122 As
Zalman and Marion argue, the innocence crisis-the exposure of a shockingly
high number of virtually indisputable wrongful convictions, especially in the
United States, over the past two decades both through post-conviction DNA
testing and by other means-constituted an external crisis for the criminal justice
system.123 Analogously, I argue that the exposure of erroneous identifications
resulting in wrongful convictions or near wrongful convictions, including, of
course, the McKie and Mayfield scandals, constituted an external crisis for
fingerprint identification. This external crisis was crucial to fingerprint reform.
The appeal of imposing change on something as venerable as fingerprint
identification merely because it is the right way to do things is rather limited. If
"wrong" (unscientific, illogical) ways of doing things still reach correct results,
busy people will be loath to invest their time and resources in supporting change.
A principled critic might respond to such indifference in a couple of
ways. First, she might argue that the right way of doing things is inherently good
and should be supported regardless of actual errors. For instance, she might argue
that scientists and sworn expert witnesses have no higher calling than to speak
the truth. If their reporting practices skew the truth (say by testifying that
fingerprinting is infallible or that the probability that the source of a print is
122 Nohrstedt & Weible, supra note 119, at 3.
123 Nancy Marion & Marvin Zalman, Towards a Theory of Innocence Policy Reform, in
CONTROVERSIES IN INNOCENCE CASES IN AMERICA 175 (Cooper ed., 2014).
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someone other than the defendant has been eliminated), that is problematic
regardless of whether the ultimate conclusion of the report ("source" or "not
source") is consistent with ground truth, despite not being logically "true."
Second, she might argue that the wrong way of doing things does produce
errors-we just don't know about them. Scholars have explained why many
fingerprint errors might go undetected.124 Thus, a principled critic might argue
that her proposed reforms will eliminate errors that might never have been
exposed and thus be error-reducing, even if she cannot prove it.
These responses notwithstanding, the principled critic clearly had a
daunting task in imbuing stingy legislatures, tradition-bound practitioners, and
courts of questionable scientific literacy with a sense of urgency to reform
fingerprint practice. How much easier it would be if the critic could connect her
argument directly to undesirable criminal justice system outcomes. Hence the
importance of the external crisis.
Exposed erroneous identifications existed prior to 1997; I counted at
least 12 of them.1 25 As I have discussed elsewhere, the profession, through a
series of clever rhetorical practices, had successfully managed to cast these errors
as aberrations irrelevant to "proper" fingerprint practice.126 However, two cases
involving exposed erroneous identifications proved resistant to these rhetorical
explanations: McKie and Mayfield.
1 27
A. Explanations Provided for Erroneous Identifications
Prior to McKie and Mayfield, exposed erroneous identifications had
been "explained" by reference to the incompetence, or possibly corruption, of
the offending examiner(s). Even when the examiner possessed strong
credentials, such as IAI certification, the examiner was post hoc deemed
incompetent. The effect was to provide the statement, "Errors do not occur in
latent print analysis.. ." with an all-purpose loophole: ". .. when performed by
a competent examiner." While there were no limits, in principle, to the extent to
which this loophole could be used, as sociologists of science would suggest, there
were limits in terms of what was socially tenable. In the Mayfield case, the FBI
laboratory had been touted for so long-whether rightly or wrongly-as the
premier crime laboratory in the United States that it would have been untenable
to "explain" the Mayfield case as a case of incompetence. In addition, the
124 See NIST REPORT, supra note 55, at 33; Simon A. Cole, More Than Zero: Accounting for
Error in Latent Fingerprint Identification, 95 J. CRiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 985, 995 (2005)
[hereinafter Cole, More Than Zero].
125 Live Science Staff, The Real Crime: 1,000 Errors in Fingerprint Matching Every Year,
LIVESCIENCE (Sept. 13, 2005), http://www.livescience.com/9341-real-crime-i-000-errors-
fingerprint-matching-year.html.
126 Cole, More Than Zero, supra note 124, at 1034-43.
127 For detail on the Mayfield case, see REVIEW OF THE FBI's HANDLING OF THE BRANDON
MAYFIELD CASE, supra note 24. For a briefer discussion, see Wax & Schatz, supra note 24.
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Mayfield identification was corroborated by an independent expert hired on the
defendant's behalf, whose bias, if any, should have tended against seeing
Mayfield as the source of the print and who was also highly credentialed, and a
well-known trainer of American latent print examiners.' 8 To be sure, a number
of other "simple" explanations that would have essentially preserved fingerprint
practice intact were floated during the initial reactions to the Mayfield scandal.
One such explanation was the quality of the digital image. Another-odd-
explanation was the high-profile nature of the case.129 To the U.S. Department of
Justice's credit, these simple explanations did not stick, and the much more
thorough and reform-generating Office of the Inspector General ("OIG") Report
was commissioned.
1 30
In the McKie Affair, there were certainly many fingerprint examiners
around the world who urged that the incompetence explanation be invoked.
However, one major difference between the two cases is that examiners
implicated in the Mayfield case quickly became convinced of their own error,
possibly because the supposed "true" source of the latent print (Daoud) was
provided to them. Therefore, at least two of the examiners cooperated, to varying
extents, with the post-mortem of their error and acquiesced to the position that it
was an error.'3' Kenneth Moses, for example, willingly turned in his IAI
certification, accepted his suspension, and today delivers riveting PowerPoint
presentations about his role in the error (presentations which, it bears mentioning,
are useful primarily because Moses recorded contemporaneous documentation
of his observations at the time of his original analysis).
1 32
In contrast, the SCRO examiners and some of their supporters have
never, to this day, acquiesced in the view that McKie was not the source of Y7.
Thus, Y7 remains a contested latent in a way that LFP 17, the disputed mark in
the Mayfield case, is not. The SCRO examiners' refusal to take the fall in quite
the same way the FBI examiners did put the government officials trying to
resolve the Affair in a bind. An "incompetence"--or, worse, corruption-
explanation would have provoked strong pushback from the SCRO and its
supporters. The alternative, however, was to contradict a century of fingerprint
dogma by positing that competent and well-intentioned examiners could make
erroneous identifications or that examiners could reasonably disagree about the
source of a mark. To much of the global fingerprint profession, this seemed
128 Simon A. Cole, The Prevalence and Potential Causes of Wrongful Conviction by
Fingerprint Evidence, 37 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 39, 65 (2006) [hereinafter Cole, Prevalence].
129 See Stacey, supra note 24.
130 REVIEW OF THE FBI's HANDLING OF THE BRANDON MAYFIELD CASE, supra note 24.
131 Cole, Prevalence, supra note 128, at 65.
132 FED. DEFENDER NEWSL., OFFICE OF THE FED. DEFENDER, EASTERN DISTRICT OF CAL., (2009),
http://www.cae-fpd.org/news/Aug09.pdf; Mark Acree, Kenneth Moses & Simon A. Cole, "Where
Is the Science in Forensic Science?", Public Defender Service for the District of Columbia, Seventh
Annual Forensic Science Conference, June 13, 2009, Washington, D.C.
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tantamount to sacrificing the credibility earned by the global fingerprint
profession over a century in order to preserve a single identification bureau.
Hence the outcry over the Justice Minister's 2002 claim that fingerprint
conclusions were matters of "opinion," not "fact," a claim which made it possible
to reconcile the Scottish examiners' competence with Shirley McKie's
innocence. 133 While the Minister's statement provoked howls of outrage,1 34 by
the time the Inquiry Report made the Minister's view its own, this claim was no
longer scandalous. A report by the British Nuffield Council on Bioethics had
taken the same view, and SWGFAST had already reduced the strength of
fingerprint conclusions from "determinations" to "decisions."'
' 35
VI. CRISIS AND ITS ROLE IN FINGERPRINT REFORM
The enormous influence of these two errors on the authorities that
supported changes in fingerprint practice is clearly visible. The McKie error was,
of course, the sole justification for the magisterial 800-page Fingerprint Inquiry
Report.136 The NAS Report relied heavily on the Mayfield error as justification
for its claim that forensic science reform was necessary, writing "The Mayfield
case and the resulting report from the Inspector General surely signal caution
against simple, and unverified, assumptions about the reliability of fingerprint
evidence."'1 37 The NIST Report cites the McKie and Mayfield cases'38 to show
"the fact that human errors can occur."'
139 The state court Rose opinion
14
0
discusses the Mayfield error extensively in justifying its conclusion that latent
print evidence failed to satisfy Maryland's admissibility standard. The FBI has
completely revamped its procedures, including incorporating procedures
explicitly designed to minimize psychological bias and circular reasoning in
response to the Mayfield case.1 '41 Scientific studies that address the key empirical
questions that would be necessary to support fingerprint conclusions cite the
133 Simon A. Cole, The 'Opinionization'ofFingerprint Evidence, 3 BIOSOCIETIES 105, 105-06
(2008).
134 Id.
135 NUFFIELD COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, THE FORENSIC USE OF BIOINFORMATION: ETHICAL ISSUES
16 (2007), http://nuffieldbioethics.org/wp-content/uploads/The-forensic-use-of-bioinformation-
ethical-issues.pdf; Sci. Working Grp. on Friction Ridge Analysis Study and Tech., supra note 58,
§ 4.3.2.2.
136 ROCKY MOUNTAIN Div. IAI, THE SILENT WITNESS 17- 18 (2012),
http://www.rmdiai.org/pdf/Newsltr46-1 .pdf.
137 NAS REPORT, supra note 55, at 105.
138 NIST REPORT, supra note 55, at vi n.3.
139 Id. at vi.
140 State v. Rose, No. K06-0545, 2007 Md. Cir. Ct. LEXIS, at * 14 (Md. Cir. Ct. Oct. 19, 2007).
141 REVIEW OF THE FBI's PROGRESS IN RESPONDING TO THE RECOMMENDATIONS IN THE OFFICE
OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, supra note 24, at 26-28.
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Mayfield case as justification.142 One of these was essentially conducted by the
FBI, the three authors being FBI contractors and employees. Dror and
colleagues' groundbreaking study on confirmation bias used the Mayfield case
for its experimental design.143 Although Dror et al. probably could have
eventually solved their design problem without the Mayfield case, their use of
Mayfield constitutes an explicit connection between the scandal and their
research. And, a recent International Forensic Symposium sponsored by NIST
and billed as "the first-ever international symposium devoted exclusively to the
topic of forensic science error management" explicitly connected this topic to the
Mayfield scandal by scheduling keynote speeches by Mayfield himself and his
attorney, Steven Wax.144
It should be noted that use of McKie and Mayfield in these documents
was somewhat rhetorical. The fact that two exposed erroneous identifications
occurred falsified absurd claims like the "infallibility" of fingerprint
identification or that the error rate ("methodological" or otherwise) was zero.'
45
But the existence of errors in no way proved that reform was necessary, that
better training, documentation, protocols, statistical studies were necessary, that
the reporting procedure needed to be changed, that examiners should be blind to
extraneous context, or that accuracy was not otherwise very high. For instance,
with regard to the Rose opinion, the fact that Mayfield occurred does not
logically render latent print evidence inadmissible. American prosecutors are
surely correct when they argue that neither U.S. admissibility standard, Frye or
Daubert, demands that evidence be error-free in order to be admissible. Daubert
demands only that the error rate be estimated and considered, not that it be
zero.146 If a court took FBI examiners at their word that they had committed only
one error in their entire history while undertaking a million fingerprint
examinations per year, it surely should find fingerprint evidence admissible,
though it should not, of course, permit the examiner to testify that the error rate
is "zero. 
147
142 E.g., Neumann et al., supra note 52, at 375; Ulery et al., Accuracy and Reliability, supra
note 68, at 7733.
143 Dror et al., supra note 117.
144 2015 International Forensics Symposium, NAT'L INST. OF STANDARDS AND TECH.,
https://www.nist.gov/director/2015-international-forensics-symposium (last visited Nov. 11,
2016).
145 For more on this issue, see Cole, More Than Zero, supra note 122.
146 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., 509 U.S. 579, 594 (1993).
147 See United States v. Baines, 573 F.3d 979, 987-88, 990-91 (10th Cir. 2009). The more
defensible reason the Rose court found latent print evidence inadmissible was that the government
failed to make a showing that addressed the crucial question of the accuracy (or "reliability") of
the technique. State v. Rose, No. K06-0545, 2007 Md. Cir. Ct. LEXIS 14, at *41 (Md. Cir. Ct. Oct.
19, 2007). The government put forward no data or studies which sought to measure or estimate the
accuracy of latent print identification. Id. Instead, the government put forward evidence purporting
to prove the uniqueness of friction ridge skin, id. at *17, invoking the fallacious reasoning that the
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Similarly, the occurrence of one erroneous identification is surely rather
weak justification for the ambitious changes to fingerprint practice
recommended by the NAS and NIST/NIJ committees. And, many of the
Fingerprint Inquiry's conclusions regarding fingerprint practice have little to do
with the McKie case itself. If the Inquiry Report is correct that fingerprint
conclusions are opinions, not facts, and should not be stated as absolute
conclusions, that was presumably true before McKie and would still be true even
if McKie had never occurred. These documents, however, attest to the rhetorical
necessity of McKie and Mayfield. Although anecdotal cases of error may provide
scant logical justification for wholesale changes, they provide strong narrative
or rhetorical justification.
VII. IMPLICATIONS OF OUR DEPENDENCE ON EXTERNAL CRISES TO EFFECT
REFORM
The above discussion shows that external crisis played a crucial role in
bringing about recent changes in fingerprint practice. McKie and Mayfield will
surely have a prominent place-a place in history that, of course, neither of them
sought-when the history of the current era of identification history is written.
This conclusion, however, is troubling. It is troubling because it
suggests that we are highly dependent on external crisis to effect necessary-for
those who believe they are necessary--changes in fingerprint practice. Perhaps
there are some who believe that the changes of the last two decades were not
truly necessary, but necessary only to defuse the scrutiny ignited by McKie and
Mayfield. This Article is directed at those others who believe that the changes of
the last two decades and the contemplated changes of the next two are necessary
and that fingerprint identification is the better for them, who agree with
Langenburg that "significant advances have been made, many of them in just the
last two decades" and that these changes are really "only the tip of the iceberg.,1'
48
I argue that such people should be troubled by the following awkward fact: Both
McKie and Mayfield were highly idiosyncratic cases that might easily have never
developed into the scandals they became.
In the case of McKie, for example, one can easily imagine a number of
decision points at which the dispute might have been quietly defused without
developing into the decade-long scandal it became. For example, McKie was
pressured numerous times to simply admit she had entered the crime scene and
end the scandal with what probably would have been a light reprimand. Had
McKie chosen to spare herself a great deal of personal agony and agree to this
compromise, there undoubtedly would never have been a McKie Affair, despite
accuracy of latent print identification can be inferred from the uniqueness of friction ridge skin.
See id. at 37-38; see also Simon A. Cole, Toward Evidence-Based Evidence: Supporting Forensic
Knowledge Claims in the Post-Daubert Era, 43 TULSA L. REv. 263 (2007) [hereinafter Cole,
Toward Evidence-Based Evidence].
148 Langenburg, supra note 59, at 14-27.
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the fact that her story would have been fairly inconsistent with other facts (like
the 24-hour police guard on the crime scene). McKie might have remained a
police officer with a reprimand on her record, the identification of Y7 would
have been counted as yet another accurate deployment of latent print analysis,
and latent print analysis might have continued on as it was. 149 In addition, without
the McKie Affair, the erroneous identification of the victim's print in Asbury's
case would probably never have been exposed.1 50 That too might have been
counted as a correct deployment of latent print analysis, and Asbury might yet
be in prison for the crime today.
In the Mayfield case, we can point to two key counterfactuals. First,
imagine if the Mayfield print had been found on American, rather than Spanish
soil. In that scenario it seems highly unlikely that any other laboratory would
have disagreed with the FBI Laboratory. Under that imagined scenario, Mayfield
might still be viewed as a correct identification. The second counterfactual is
more realistic. We now know that Mayfield was apprehended on May 6, 2004,
because of a media leak in Europe;51 the FBI feared that he would be tipped off
that he was under surveillance and flee. 52 The SNP managed to convince the
FBI that Daoud, not Mayfield, was the source of LFP17 on May 19.153 Had the
media leak not occurred, the FBI might have become convinced of their error
before apprehending Mayfield, who was under surveillance through a secret
warrant through the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act.154 Only the FBI
knows what it would have done under those circumstances. Would it have
publicized the error? Would it have commissioned a report of the scope of the
OIG Report (not to mention the other two reports)? Or, would the FBI have kept
silent and continued to testify in court that FBI examiners had never made an
error, as it had been doing up until the exposure of the Mayfield case?55
Whatever the answer, it seems doubtful that Mayfield would have had the impact
in prompting change in fingerprint practice that it did when it erupted into a full-
fledged scandal.
In other words, the McKie and Mayfield scandals were both fortuitous
events; they might easily never have happened. And, if they had not happened, it
seems very unlikely that all of the recent changes in fingerprint practice would
have happened without them. Perhaps some progress would have been made in
conceptualizing fingerprint identification in "ridgeological" terms and as ACE-
V. Perhaps the 16-point standard would have been abandoned. However, the
149 MCKIE & RUSSELL, supra note 1, at 16.
150 Id. at 127.
151 REVIEW OF THE FBI's HANDLING OF THE BRANDON MAYFIELD CASE, supra note 24, at 60-
61.
152 Id.
153 Id. at 81-82.
154 Id. at 38.
155 Cole, More Than Zero, supra note 124.
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profession might still be claiming fingerprinting is infallible, that fingerprint
conclusions are "facts," denying the existence confirmation bias, reporting
absolute conclusions, claiming contemporaneous documentation is unnecessary,
and denying the need for accuracy or rarity studies. For all those, especially those
within the profession, who believe that these things are not true, this should be a
frightening thought. The profession might still be saying things that are not true.
The McKie and Mayfield scandals, then, highlight the fragility of a
practice that depends on external crisis in order to effect change. Crisis is an
extremely poor mechanism for effecting reform in any endeavor. There are some
obvious reasons for this-crises tend to be extreme, polarizing, and inflame
passions. But the less obvious reason is that we cannot count on them. Scandals
are, by definition, idiosyncratic and sporadic, sometimes viewed as "the
proverbial iceberg tip.., events in which the usually concealed corrupt
components of social systems are revealed to the public."156 If we have a
problem, we cannot count on an external crisis exposing it in a timely manner
because external crises erupt sporadically and fortuitously.
Another problem with crises is that, as they inevitably attract attention,
post-mortems, official reports, explanations, and recommendations for reform,
we tend to equate them with actual errors. Because exposed errors are viewed as
representative of all errors, exposed and unexposed, we fall into the habit of
thinking of exposed errors as all errors. But exposed errors are not equivalent to
errors, and they may not even be representative of errors-they may merely be
representative of exposure mechanisms.157 Thus, crises provoke reforms-as
they should. But, it is also important to constantly keep in mind that crises
represent merely the errors that have been exposed and, further, developed into
full-fledged scandals. Responding to crisis makes it cognitively difficult to keep
in mind that there may be other undetected errors that did not become scandals
and that there surely will be errors, both detected and undetected, perhaps with
different proximate causes, in the future.
In the case of the McKie and Mayfield scandals, we had a practice that
was routinely touted as "infallible" for nearly a century. This is now conceded to
have been false, and reforms have been implemented. We must, however, resist
the tendency to use these reforms as a pretext to reconstruct the aura of
"infallibility" (or even virtual infallibility) once again. The lesson of the McKie
and Mayfield scandals is not that fingerprinting was fallible and claimed it
wasn't, but now it has been fixed. The lesson is that claims of infallibility, past
and future, are always suspect, if not inherently false and misleading. Forensic
science, however, has shown a disturbing tendency to respond to crises by
addressing specific, local causes and then declaring the practice "reliable" once
156 Ai ADUT, ON SCANDAL: MORAL DISTURBANCES IN SOCIETY, POLITICS, AND ART 9 (2008).
157 See Cole, Toward Evidence-Based Evidence, supra note 147, at 278.
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again.158 This disturbing tendency is already visible in fingerprint examiners'
testimony-and courts' crediting of it-that the possibility of error can be
accounted for by calculating a proportion with the number of known errors in the
numerator and the number of all fingerprint examinations ever undertaken in the
denominator.159 Such statements, with their faulty assumption that exposed
errors can be equated with actual errors, entirely miss the central point of exposed
erroneous identifications like McKie and Mayfield-that we cannot ever assume
that we have absolutely reliable mechanisms for exposing errors.
We have not merely learned from the McKie and Mayfield scandals that
there were problems. We also learned that we had very poor mechanisms set up
to make stakeholders aware of problems. We cannot avoid the conclusion that
efforts to raise awareness prior to the external crisis were staunchly resisted and
met with limited success, and it is not clear that they ever would have been
successful without the McKie and Mayfield scandals. Litigation, which might
have been thought to be an appropriate way to raise awareness of the problem,
was even less effective. Indeed, the NAS Report termed the U.S. courts' handling
of forensic science "utterly ineffective.,160 We learned that external crisis was
necessary to generate awareness of the deficiencies of fingerprint identification.
VIII. CONCLUSION: PERMANENT MECHANISMS FOR IMPROVEMENT
The McKie and Mayfield scandals demonstrated the need not merely for
reform, but also for what we might call "the reform of reform." One challenge is
to address the problems with fingerprint practice that were exposed by the McKie
and Mayfield scandals themselves and by other currents of criticism that gained
legitimacy because of the Affair: the overstating of the probative value of results,
absence of basic empirical studies, deficits in education and training, poorly
maintained protocols, failure of documentation, need to reconceptualize the
analytic process, and so on. As discussed above, this level of reform is now
receiving a great, perhaps unprecedented, deal of attention.
A second challenge has received far less attention. This second challenge
consists of addressing how future problems like those described in the preceding
paragraph are to be brought to the attention of various stakeholders (practitioners,
judges, attorneys, government officials, scientific institutions, the public). In
other words, how will stakeholders in the future be made aware when there is a
need for further reform? The current era of reform needs to do more than merely
158 See, e.g., Cary T. Oien, Forensic Hair Comparison: Background Information for
Interpretation, 11 FORENSIC SCI. COMM. (2009), http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/lab/forensic-science-
communications/fsc/april2009/review/2009 04_reviewo2.htm; Peter E. Peterson et al., Latent
Prints: A Perspective on the State of the Science, 11 FORENSIC SCI. COMM. (2009),
https://archives.fbi.gov/archives/about-us/lab/forensic-science-
communications/fsc/oct2009/review.
159 United States v. Baines, 573 F.3d 979, 989-91 (10th Cir. 2009).
160 NAS REPORT, supra note 55, at 109.
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address the problems that have been recently exposed. It also needs to work on
how future problems will be exposed. What mechanisms should be put in place
so that external crisis is not required for future reforms? This issue deserves more
attention that it has received.
The goal, moving forward, should be to create structures that can be
responsive to critique and implement change without depending on external
crisis. The fingerprint practices that are created post-McKie will be better, but
they will not be perfect. We should not require future McKies to suffer as they
did for improvement to occur. The Inquiry Report's approach to this issue may
be found in its recommendations in favor of "engaging with ... the academic
community."'16 1 These recommendations seem especially pertinent since, as I
have discussed, recent history suggests that the academic community's influence
on fingerprint practice was limited without the added impetus of scandal.
However, the Inquiry Report's recommendations lack specifics. They might be
satisfied by true engagement with the academic community or by paying mere
lip service to such engagement. The NAS Report sought to address this issue
through its proposed National Institute of Forensic Science ("NIFS").162 Being a
permanent watchdog for ensuring that necessary reforms in forensic practice are
identified and enacted would seem to be one of the tasks the NAS Committee
envisioned for NIFS.163 But prospects for the NIFS becoming reality seem dim.
Instead, the U.S. Department of Justice and NIST have jointly created a National
Commission on Forensic Science ("NCFS").164 This is an excellent organization,
but there are not thus far any explicit plans to make it permanent. And, even
under the best circumstances, persuasive questions have been raised about
whether even a nominally independent NFIS would be able to resist regulatory
capture by law enforcement or, more generally, the state.
Permanent mechanisms for exposing problems in forensic science sit
uneasily with the adversarial context in which forensic science is situated-even
in legal systems that are called "inquisitorial," rather than "adversarial." An
ability to issue assurances that all problems were in the past, have been
addressed, and are no longer relevant is crucial to maintaining the credibility of
the forensic expert witness. Such a stance is difficult to maintain when an official
institution exists which is in the business of, for example, finding and
documenting problems, weaknesses, and areas for improvement in forensic
science.1 65 That, however, is the kind of institution we need--one that never
again touts claims of perfection or infallibility and one that does not believe in
an end to the process of improvement.
161 CAMPBELL, supra note 1, 35.135.
162 NAS REPORT, supra note 55, at 19.
163 See id.
164 National Commission on Forensic Science, U.S. DEP'T JUST., https://www.justice.gov/ncfs
(last visited Nov. 11, 2016).
165 NAS REPORT, supra note 55, at 19-26.
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